8/26/42

The Setting of the Sun (August 1942)

Captain Samuel Jenkins
USS Atlanta
26th August 1942

At Coral Sea and Midway, we the succeeded in halting the Japanese advance. In the Solomons, we not only stopped them, but pushed them back. The battle at Guadacanal just had to be the turning point for us. Almost everything in the fleet was committed to the battle.



The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, most of which took place on August 24, had been less a tremendous clash of arms than a series of skirmishes. Strategically for us it must be considered a partial failure since over these next few days Admiral Tanaka succeeded in landing large numbers of troops on Guadacanal.

What is distinctive about the Eastern Solomons is the inadequacy of our reconnaissance effort. Neither shore nor tender-based air came through when it was really needed. McCain's planes should have tracked the enemy first but they did not. When their patrols failed to come up with what was needed, carrier-borne planes should have but they did not either. Communications inadequacies only agravated the situation. Submarines contributed little if any and could have filled the reconnaissance gap.

Most pronounced in this battle was our ability to destroy enemy planes in both air combat and through anti-aircraft fire. Air losses decided the issue. Our navy lost a total of 17 carrier planes in the confused, hesitant and inconclusive clash, and Japan suffered several times that. In the end, the IJN broke off the fight after being stripped of their carrier aircraft although their powerful surface force was still largely intact. Their loss of Ryujo on the other hand, gave us a slight tactical victory especially since we managed to save the damaged Enterprise. Chitose also survived. We did not even attack Tanaka's Guadacanal reinforcement convoy until later.

Our fundamental problem was quite clear: we did not have sufficient sea control to be really secure on land. Neither does Japan however, even though some of their equipment and tactics were better suited to the kind of war being fought. This should be our next priority.

6/4/42

Aim for that Rising Sun (1942)


Battle of Midway
Ens. Ronald Weber, Dive Bomber Pilot, USS Enterprise
4th June, 1942


When we arrived over the Japanese fleet, it was still untouched. The previous attack from the planes based on Midway Island failed to do any damage on them, and it looks like our ancient torpedo bombers didn't score any hits either. Our planes were just not able to get close to the carrier fleet to attack them. Most of our losses was not because of the anti-aircraft guns from the carrier but instead, it was from the combat air patrol (CAP) and the dreadful Zero fighter. Our current front line fighter, the Wildcat, was not match to the Zero fighter, let alone the slower and less maneuver SBD and TBD bomber, hopefully the new fighter, the Hellcat will fare better against the Zero, but for now, we have to make do with this. Even though the Wildcat is more heavily armed and better protected, the Zero is more maneuverable thus making it a better dogfighter. Most of our current planes stand no chance against them. What is the point of having escort fighter planes when they can’t even protect themselves?



However, the wildcat pilots have employed a new tactic called the ‘Thach weave’ that would counter the superiority of the Zero fighter during dogfights. Due to the lack of agility of the wildcat fighters, the ‘Thach weave’ was invented whereby pairs of fighters would provide cover for the other by flying in a crisscross pattern. Because of ‘Thach weave’, the wildcats were able to give us better support from the Zeros and enabling us to focus our attacks on the carriers. But because this tactic was never used before, only one squadron was able to practise it. Hopefully the Navy will be able to follow up with this tactic as it has shown its effectiveness in just one engagement.



To make matter worse, the torpedoes that were equipped on our bombers were not helping our cause; they were not effective on the Japanese carriers. From where we were flying, we could see the torpedoes being fired against the carriers but the torpedoes were moving very slowly in the water and it seems like it travels way too near to the surface of the water. From what we heard from the other pilots, at least 10 being fired on the Hiryu but none manage to damage it. Furthermore, they said that naval personals on the carrier used the deck machine gun and manage to blow up one of the torpedo. The weapons that we had were just substandard. The Devastator torpedo bombers suffered heavy losses but no hits on the carriers.



However after the failed TBD attacks, luck was on the our side and we fared much better. Somehow, the attacks by the TBD were able to command most of the attention of the deadly Zero fighters and CAP, furthermore, the carriers were not able to launch more fighters into the air as the carriers had to take evasive actions due to the TBD attack. The attacks by both the TBD and SBD had thrown the CAP into disarray. Within a few hours of unrelentless attacks by our fighters, we had scored hits after hits on 3 of the Japanese carriers. From our view point flying overhead of the battlefield, we were able to the horizon blazing with burning oil, thick black smoke billowing out of the engulfed burning Japanese carriers. What joy for us to see such a sight.



No news about the other Japanese carriers. Though we have inflicted heavy loss on the Japanese carrier fleet, we too have suffered a lot, many of our pilots has yet to return.

5/27/42

On the other side of the Pond... (May 1942)


Admiral Chester Nimitz
CINCPAC, Pearl Harbor
27th May, 1942

Just saw Yorktown pull into the drydock. She's fought hard in the Coral Sea. Fletcher reports the sinking of the Ryukaku and the Shokaku.That leaves the IJN with around four to five carriers. We lost the Lexington, but one for two is a pretty good trade. More importantly, we've learned that our flyboys are just as capable as the Japs, though their equipment is certainly better.

Well, I'm going to need Yorktown to fight even harder soon, hence all the emergency yard work. Intelligence tells me that they've decoded the order of battle for the Japanese attack on Midway. They'll have four fleet carriers, and I'm not willing to send Enterprise and Hornet off on two to one odds, Midway air cover or no. But if we can fight them on an even footing, like we did down in the Solomons, we might be able to push our war plans ahead much sooner than anticipated. Saratoga will be here soon, Wasp by year's end along with Essex. BuShips tells me that I'll get five to six Essex class carriers per year starting next year. Even assuming a one to one exchange rate, we'll run them out of carriers very soon, and as soon as we destroy their main strike forces, we can move to the next stage of Plan Orange and secure operating bases in the Western Pacific from which to begin our air and surface blockade of Japanese merchant shipping.

Till then we'll have to rely on our submarines to interdict that shipping. But despite Stark's order for unrestricted submarine warfare, we aren't sinking all that many Japanese merchant ships. ComSubPac claims that it's the torpedoes, and I'm inclined to believe him and his submariners over some desk-jockey in BuOrd. But if that's the case, then we're going to have to pick up the slack by expediting the destruction of the Japanese carriers. I don't want them getting one more ounce of oil or gram of rubber if there's anything I can do about it!

5/3/42

A Fatalistic Outlook (May 1942)


Admiral Nagumo Chuichi

Commander, Carrier Striking Force
IJNS Yamato
3rd May, 1942

Once again, I decided to let Genda handle the wargames today. It's clear that Yamamoto doesn't value my input, and I can't oppose this operation any more without looking like a coward. The wargames are a clear indication of how the wind's blowing anyway. We've barely had month to plan this operation, one that will involve every single one of our capital ships, carriers and battleships alike, along with an Army contingent to handle ground invasions, and spread out across half of the Pacific! Yet Ugaki keeps glossing over the problems that arise during the games. Most of our staffs haven't worked together before, and we constantly run into delays or coordination failures. And that's just the staff side of the problem!

The tactical portion is clearly farcical as well. Earlier today, the staff officer playing the Red Force came up with an excellent plan. He concentrated the US carriers together and detached them from their battleships, allowing them to reach Midway far faster than we planned for. As such, they could engage my carriers in concert with land based air on Midway, hitting us in the flank while I was occupied with engaging Midway. We rolled the dice, and three carriers were sunk or heavily damaged. At this point, the invasion couldn't possibly continue without sufficient air cover. It was a sensible plan, just what I would have done if I was in the Americans' position.

But Ugaki thought otherwise. He said that those tactics were "impossible", and rewound the clock. Of course that staffer complained, but the poor young man had to shut up when Yamamoto chimed in about how the Americans were more likely to arrive in full force and attempt to relieve Midway instead.

So instead the operation goes as planned, and the land based bombers from Midway conduct an attack against my carriers. We roll the dice and Akagi and Kaga are sunk. Ugaki intervenes again, saying that that's impossible, and that only Kaga is hit, and is not even sunk for that matter, because we need it for later operations near Australia. It was at that point I gave up all hope that these wargames would have any value whatsoever. They are so obviously choreographed to fit what Yamamoto thinks should happen.

Still, he was right about Pearl Harbor. He might be right this time too. I certainly hope so, since we are in a rather precarious situation now. American resolve does not seem to be breaking, and we are in this for the long haul, we can't afford to lose any of our carriers. We have a solid advantage now, six fleet carriers to their five, and 5 light carriers to their one. Our pilots are better trained, and they have trained and fought together. But we need to gain a sufficiently large advantage as soon as possible. Other than Taiho, the other three of our fleet carriers under construction are all conversions. In the meantime, we know that the Americans are building no fewer than twelve dedicated fleet carriers. The only way to keep the odds even is to smash their entire carrier fleet now without taking any losses, and the haphazard way this operation is being executed is very worrying.

Now I am certainly not doubting the reason for this operation. Yamamoto is right, we must complete our destruction of the US Pacific Fleet while it is still weak. To do so, we must clearly draw them out of their safe haven in Pearl Harbor, and attacking Midway would certainly accomplish that task. But the Navy General Staff's incomprehensible focus on the Aleutians forces us to divide our already limited forces with our numerical advantage already being fairly slim. At the same time, due to weather conditions in the Aleutians, we must launch the attack in early June, hence the whole rush to prepare.

And planning and wargaming are just the start of our problems. Production in our naval aircraft plants have barely permitted to fully outfit the First Carrier Striking Force, but only after dangerously depleting the majority of our light carriers' airwings. As if that wasn't bad enough, Shokaku and Zuikaku are off attacking Port Moresby. They won't be able to train with the rest of the Striking Force after they get back, not to mention even though they aren't expected to encounter serious resistance, we'll probably need to deplete another light carrier for the aircraft and pilots to make up the losses.

Well, if something terrible happens, Akagi's sure to be a target, and I'll be able to go down with my ship.

2/15/42

The Lion's Claws, the Unicorn's Horn, Shattered (February 1942)

Lieutenant Tom Wade

15th February 1942

Singapore, the 'city of lions' had fallen. The greatest military name in all Asia and Australasia had been humbled after a 70-day campaign and with it had fallen the richest country of the world, taking into account its population - the rubber and tin-bearing Malay States. The defenders and the world were awestruck: a giant had proved to have feet of clay. Singapore had surrendered.

Contrary to popular belief, Singapore was not a fortress in any sense of the word. Millions of pounds had been spent with the idea of making it one, but millions more would still be needed. The money spent had bought it a well-equipped naval base, a giant floating dock, five 15-inch guns set in the hills facing the sea and a number of 9.2- and 6-inch batteries guarding the sea approaches. It had also bought many large barracks, three airfields and a well-defended small island, Blakang Mati, next to the harbour. But it provided zero defences of any kind on the northern, western and even portions of the southern shore of the island.

The Japanese had command of the air and command of the sea and proved themselves superior on land. Command of the air and sea could scarcely have been avoided in the Far East at that time, and around a peninsula like Malaya their superiority in those areas proved decisive. But superiority on land was due to more thorough training and greater experience. The Japanese made themselves masters of jungle warfare and fought with efficiency, determination and speed which only perfect training brings. They used their three main weapons - mortars, infantry guns and tanks - to the best possible effect, and to this they added unflagging determination and breathtaking speed.

Compare this to us, the British. Some of us had three years of war experience in China, whereas most of us had none. The generalship of General Yamashita was brilliant; our generalship was almost always bad and wrong. It was weak and uninspiring; its existence was rarely felt. And we had dreadfully underestimated the Japanese. A few of us tried to offer excuses for our defeat. They said we ran out of aircraft or ammunition or water. The answer to this was best given by a Lancashire private of the Loyal Regiment: 'The only thing we run out of was land!'.

Why I had not contemplated getting onto a ship out to sea bound for Java was beyond me. And now Changi awaits.

2/14/42

The Rising Sun over the Lion City (February 1942)


William Henry Giles,
February 14, 1942.

All is lost now. The Japanese troops have reached the center of the Singapore. In less than 100days, the British has been pushed back all the way from northern Malaya to Singapore. How is this even possible? The Japanese army just seems too powerful and invincible, no matter how strongly the British defended or counterattack, all their actions seem futile and were easily swept away by advancing Japanese. At the beginning of the war, we were told that the Japanese soldiers were incapable of jungle warfare, half blind and feeble, but the ‘feeble’ enemy was hammering the British blows after blows of defeat. Even with the British numerical advantage in both men and heavy artillery by 3 to 1, they were not able to stop the Japanese. The Japanese made up the disadvantage in heavy guns by capturing British guns and use it against them.

The swiftness of the Japanese attack down south was staggering. Bicycle infantry troops were able to out-maneuver the British defensive position. Furthermore, the Japanese infantry were being supported by tanks and aircrafts. By comparison, the British had no tanks at all and planes they had, the Brewster buffalos were outclassed by the Japanese Zero fighters. Naval support for the British vanished after the sinking of the only 2 warships in the region on the 10th Dec, 1941.

The last ship departed Singapore on the 12th of Feb; escaping the colony now is impossible. Surrender is most likely going to happen soon as all the reservoirs on island, the only water supply to Singapore has been severed. British rule on the island is over and now begins Japanese rule.