The Beginning of the End (March 1945)

Lieutenant Suzuki Yuuki

5th Division HQ, Hiroshima

28th March 1945

The loss of Iwo Jima was a particularly devastating setback for us. We did not expect to ever lose to the Allies on our home soil. Though we have lost much of what we have gained in Southeast Asia, we were determined to exact a such a heavy cost in Allied lives as they start attacking our homeland. At the very least we would be able to get achieve a negotiated peace as a substitute for unconditional surrender and probably salvage part of our empire rather than losing it all totally. Iwo Jima is just 750 miles south of Tokyo. We have transformed it into a sophisticated observation platform and even erected more than one radar installation which would have made it a perfect base for forward fighters to interdict Allied air strikes on our other islands. Its defence was superior bar none, as it continued to stand even after heavy bombardment by the Allies. Now that we have lost it to them, the tide has turned against us. They are definitely going to use the island’s three airfields to aid in their progress up north towards Tokyo.

But we would not let that happen at any cost. We still have control over Okinawa, the final key island in the Ryukyu chain before mainland Japan proper. We have to defend it at all cost. But our chances look slimmer by the day. Word has it that the British are sending their most superior warships clad in super strong steel to participate in their first Pacific campaign together with the Americans. Once they establish control over the seas, it would be difficult to receive reinforcements and supplies. We have to trust the kamikaze fighters to neutralise those warships before they come any closer. Without supplies we our efforts would be hampered greatly as the Allies try to surround and cut us off from the mainland to strangle us.

Tightening the Noose (October 1944)

Koizumi Nanasake

Captain, Japanese Freighter Kobayashi Maru

13^th October 1944

The Americans are like demons. How else could they be shrugging off the constant defeats dealt to them by our Navy? How else could they possibly sink so much of our shipping? I’ve been to America, I know that they are most certainly not demons. Therefore the fault, as it is becoming increasingly apparent to me, is with our own leadership.

We didn’t begin convoying till early this year, but by then we had already suffered catastrophic losses in terms of merchant shipping sunk. I suppose everyone was expecting the sinking rate to be something closer to that of 1942, but even then the Americans were sinking more ships than we were building. And our convoy escorts aren’t all that effective either. Just last month, despite heavy escort, the Azusa, one of our last few tankers, was sunk by an American submarine.

Japan needs more resources before it can build more merchants and escorts, but at the same time we don’t have enough merchant ships to bring those resources to Japan. Most of us had already been requisitioned by the Army and Navy anyway. And from what I heard from some of the other merchant captains, most of them dead now, there was nearly no organization at all in transporting those hard fought for materials back home. Two of them even mentioned passing by each other, heading to the port that the other left, while empty. Each was sent to pick up supplies from the other port, something that could have been done by a just one of them in half the time.

We certainly don’t have that sort of luxury anymore. We are currently on a resupply run to the Navy’s island bases, and we just departed Iwo Jima a few days ago. I can’t forget the Army doctor pleading with me for just a few more sacks of rice for his troops. While they weren’t dying of starvation just yet, many of them were suffering from diseases due to malnutrition. I sympathized, but my orders are very clear on how much to deliver. It’s bad everywhere anyway. In any case, our next stop is

[Record Ends]

Cutting the lifelines (May 1943)

Dick O’Kane, Executive officer, USS Wahoo.

23 May 1943

I have been with the men of the USS Wahoo for 5 patrols already and it now time for me to be moving on to command my own submarine, the new Balao-class submarine. But the time spent with the Wahoo is fruitful and I have learnt much from the skipper, Lt-Cmdr Morton.

In the first 2 patrol, we were made to patrol the shipping lanes just off Truk. The ships in that area were practical unescorted, not only for the merchant ships but also the Imperial Japanese naval ships. For instance, we came across an unescorted Japanese carrier but we were not able to attack it and the most defended convoy we saw was escorted only by one destroyer. I think that the Japanese were unaware of US presence in the area. However, even with the advantage that we have, we were not able to inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese. This is partly because of the lack of aggressive of Lt-Cmdr Kennedy, our first skipper, and bad positioning of the ship. The total number of ships we sank during that time was 2 freighters. We could have gotten more if we had been more aggressive in our tactic.

After the first 2 patrols, Lt-Cmdr Kennedy was transferred to the USS Guest and Lt-Comdr Morton took over as skipper of the ship. This change in command changed our fortunes. We departed for our 3^rd patrol on the 16 January and headed for a new patrolling area called Wewak near the north coast of New Guniea. We spotted and sunk a destroyer anchor off the Kairuru Island. On the same patrol, we caught up with an unescorted 4 ships convoy on the 26 January. The battle with that convoy lasted for 10 hours and we expended all of our torpedoes but it resulted in 2 sunken freighters, a badly damaged troop carrier and tanker.

The 4^th and 5^th patrol of the Wahoo produced the similar results. A total of 14 merchant ships were sunk, 11 on the 4^th patrol and 3 on the 5^th patrol. Up to now, the Japanese failed to put improve it protection on the merchant ships. The merchant ships were sailing without any escort nor travelling in huge convoys, this allowed us and the other US submarines to attack their vital supply routes without serious opposition for the Imperial navy. The Wahoo was so successful the Admiral Nimitz awarded Morton his second Navy Cross and other awards on the 22 May 1943. Now is time for the Wahoo to undergo an overhaul and it is time too for me to move on to another ship.

More damage could be done on them if we were equipped with better torpedoes. The Mark 14 torpedoes were unreliable; they would either detonate prematurely or would be a dud. This is very frustrating for us and many other submarines in the fleet. From what I heard from other submarine Cmdrs, they would be equipped with faulty torpedoes for an entire patrol. Rumour has it that a new type of torpedo is currently in developing and I hope that this new weapon would make the submarine force a more potent weapon in the war

The news is in! we got HIM! (April 1943)

18 April 1943

Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet

diary entry: 2210 hours

Yamamoto was escorted by a squadron of Zeros, but our Lightnings managed to break through their shield and shoot his plane down before it could take evasive action. Though we lost several pilots and planes in the attack, our pilots confirmed that Yamamoto's plane caught fire and crashed in the jungle..no way anyone could have survived that.

We’ve now gone part of the way in laying the ghosts of Pearl to rest, may his soul anoint for the men that have been lost, and may his loss to Japan now ensure our liberation of the rest of the Pacific and avenge fully Pearl Harbor!

Mission: Intercept and kill Yamamoto on his journey (April 1943)

10 April 1943

Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet

diary entry at 2330.

What an accomplishment our intel boys have pulled off, we’ve managed to decode a report transmitted on Japanese radio frequencies of that bastard’s Yamamoto decision to tour Japanese outposts in the Pacific. He will leave Rabaul on the 18th for the airfield in Kahili, Bougainville. What luck! His flight plan is just barely within range of our aircraft. Though it will require the maximum possible range of our Lightnings, with additional fuel tanks attached to their planes we can intercept and shoot the bastard down before reinforcements from Kahili can reach him. Though it will cost us more pilots and planes, the losses sustained to get him will suffice to avenge our brave air and ship crews lost in that “cheap shot” of an attack against Pearl. While we mourn, his plan has been herald as a master- class of deployment to take out your enemy unaware by surprise. Well, it time to pay him back with the same tactics, we CANNOT let him get away!

The Setting of the Sun (August 1942)

Captain Samuel Jenkins

USS Atlanta

26th August 1942

At Coral Sea and Midway, we the succeeded in halting the Japanese advance. In the Solomons, we not only stopped them, but pushed them back. The battle at Guadacanal just had to be the turning point for us. Almost everything in the fleet was committed to the battle.

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, most of which took place on August 24, had been less a tremendous clash of arms than a series of skirmishes. Strategically for us it must be considered a partial failure since over these next few days Admiral Tanaka succeeded in landing large numbers of troops on Guadacanal.

What is distinctive about the Eastern Solomons is the inadequacy of our reconnaissance effort. Neither shore nor tender-based air came through when it was really needed. McCain's planes should have tracked the enemy first but they did not. When their patrols failed to come up with what was needed, carrier-borne planes should have but they did not either. Communications inadequacies only agravated the situation. Submarines contributed little if any and could have filled the reconnaissance gap.

Most pronounced in this battle was our ability to destroy enemy planes in both air combat and through anti-aircraft fire. Air losses decided the issue. Our navy lost a total of 17 carrier planes in the confused, hesitant and inconclusive clash, and Japan suffered several times that. In the end, the IJN broke off the fight after being stripped of their carrier aircraft although their powerful surface force was still largely intact. Their loss of Ryujo on the other hand, gave us a slight tactical victory especially since we managed to save the damaged Enterprise. Chitose also survived. We did not even attack Tanaka's Guadacanal reinforcement convoy until later.

Our fundamental problem was quite clear: we did not have sufficient sea control to be really secure on land. Neither does Japan however, even though some of their equipment and tactics were better suited to the kind of war being fought. This should be our next priority.

Aim for that Rising Sun (1942)

Battle of Midway

Ens. Ronald Weber, Dive Bomber Pilot, USS Enterprise

4th June, 1942

When we arrived over the Japanese fleet, it was still untouched. The previous attack from the planes based on Midway Island failed to do any damage on them, and it looks like our ancient torpedo bombers didn't score any hits either. Our planes were just not able to get close to the carrier fleet to attack them. Most of our losses was not because of the anti-aircraft guns from the carrier but instead, it was from the combat air patrol (CAP) and the dreadful Zero fighter. Our current front line fighter, the Wildcat, was not match to the Zero fighter, let alone the slower and less maneuver SBD and TBD bomber, hopefully the new fighter, the Hellcat will fare better against the Zero, but for now, we have to make do with this. Even though the Wildcat is more heavily armed and better protected, the Zero is more maneuverable thus making it a better dogfighter. Most of our current planes stand no chance against them. What is the point of having escort fighter planes when they can’t even protect themselves?

However, the wildcat pilots have employed a new tactic called the ‘Thach weave’ that would counter the superiority of the Zero fighter during dogfights. Due to the lack of agility of the wildcat fighters, the ‘Thach weave’ was invented whereby pairs of fighters would provide cover for the other by flying in a crisscross pattern. Because of ‘Thach weave’, the wildcats were able to give us better support from the Zeros and enabling us to focus our attacks on the carriers. But because this tactic was never used before, only one squadron was able to practise it. Hopefully the Navy will be able to follow up with this tactic as it has shown its effectiveness in just one engagement.

To make matter worse, the torpedoes that were equipped on our bombers were not helping our cause; they were not effective on the Japanese carriers. From where we were flying, we could see the torpedoes being fired against the carriers but the torpedoes were moving very slowly in the water and it seems like it travels way too near to the surface of the water. From what we heard from the other pilots, at least 10 being fired on the Hiryu but none manage to damage it. Furthermore, they said that naval personals on the carrier used the deck machine gun and manage to blow up one of the torpedo. The weapons that we had were just substandard. The Devastator torpedo bombers suffered heavy losses but no hits on the carriers.

However after the failed TBD attacks, luck was on the our side and we fared much better. Somehow, the attacks by the TBD were able to command most of the attention of the deadly Zero fighters and CAP, furthermore, the carriers were not able to launch more fighters into the air as the carriers had to take evasive actions due to the TBD attack. The attacks by both the TBD and SBD had thrown the CAP into disarray. Within a few hours of unrelentless attacks by our fighters, we had scored hits after hits on 3 of the Japanese carriers. From our view point flying overhead of the battlefield, we were able to the horizon blazing with burning oil, thick black smoke billowing out of the engulfed burning Japanese carriers. What joy for us to see such a sight.

No news about the other Japanese carriers. Though we have inflicted heavy loss on the Japanese carrier fleet, we too have suffered a lot, many of our pilots has yet to return.