A Retrospective (December 1945)

Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King

Chief of Naval Operations

Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, December 7, 1945

To think that all these poor boys died for something as stupid as this war. If the Japanese had a lick of sense, they wouldn’t have attacked in the first place, ‘cause they certainly didn’t have any chance of winning when they started it!

Sure, they hit us hard at Pearl, and if they caught Halsey’s carriers that day we wouldn’t have been able to act as aggressively as we did in 1942. With our building program, all that would have done was to delay “Midway” to sometime in ’43 or ’44.

And while that was going on, our submarine blockade would have been drawing the noose tighter and tighter around their necks. Their anti-submarine capability was a joke throughout the war, their merchant shipping construction rates even worse. Even with defective torpedoes and poor pre-war training and doctrine, we were already sinking more tonnage than they were building in 1942.

Thus it didn’t matter when our hammer blow fell, ‘cause when it did, they would never be able to recover from it.

Could they have stopped us from building that hammer? Not a chance. Hitting Pearl was already a stretch for them, there was no way that they were going to hit the yards on the West Coast. There was no way they could have taken Pearl either, certainly not after we reinforced it.

Could they have stopped us from tying the noose then? I admit it’s possible, but their high command seemed oblivious to the need to protect the ships carrying those vital supplies they started the whole war over in the first place! And they ignored it while constantly pushing outwards, towards the Solomons, the Aleutians, Australia, all efforts that would have drained even more resources for little gain.

Now, I’m not saying the Japs didn’t have a powerful Navy at the start, they certainly did! In a straight up fight, Mahan-esque Battle Fleet versus Battle Fleet we would’ve lost, no question. But as they say, it isn't how big it is, it's how you use it, and to paraphrase our dear Secretary of the Navy, or at least what I think good ol’ Frank Knox wanted to say, “These guys had no idea that they had no idea what the hell they were doing!”

The Beginning of the End (March 1945)

Sergeant Willie Blake

5th Marine Division, Iwo Jima

30th March 1945

Victory is upon us. Our win at Iwo Jima meant only one thing: that the Japanese have finally become weak enough to not be able to defend their own homeland. Iwo Jima also provided us with emergency landing strips for the thousands of planes flying the three-thousand mile trip from Tinian and Saipan. Okinawa should fall in no time. However the fight has not been easy. The Japanese have resorted to suicide kamikaze soldiers to inflict maximum damage on our ships. Thank goodness the British ships are tougher than any of ours and could withstood the attacks with minimal damage. On land, their defence has been stronger than expected. We have been fighting a war of attrition for a few days now. Our technology may have been better, but the harsh terrain nullified any of the potential benefits they may bring. What disturbed me most are the local Okinawans, peaceful traditional agricultural communities torn apart by attacks on both sides. While we have in place policies to deal with them, it is really difficult sorting them out as some of the women are fighting side by side with the Japanese soldiers!

The Beginning of the End (March 1945)

Lieutenant Suzuki Yuuki

5th Division HQ, Hiroshima

28th March 1945

The loss of Iwo Jima was a particularly devastating setback for us. We did not expect to ever lose to the Allies on our home soil. Though we have lost much of what we have gained in Southeast Asia, we were determined to exact a such a heavy cost in Allied lives as they start attacking our homeland. At the very least we would be able to get achieve a negotiated peace as a substitute for unconditional surrender and probably salvage part of our empire rather than losing it all totally. Iwo Jima is just 750 miles south of Tokyo. We have transformed it into a sophisticated observation platform and even erected more than one radar installation which would have made it a perfect base for forward fighters to interdict Allied air strikes on our other islands. Its defence was superior bar none, as it continued to stand even after heavy bombardment by the Allies. Now that we have lost it to them, the tide has turned against us. They are definitely going to use the island’s three airfields to aid in their progress up north towards Tokyo.

But we would not let that happen at any cost. We still have control over Okinawa, the final key island in the Ryukyu chain before mainland Japan proper. We have to defend it at all cost. But our chances look slimmer by the day. Word has it that the British are sending their most superior warships clad in super strong steel to participate in their first Pacific campaign together with the Americans. Once they establish control over the seas, it would be difficult to receive reinforcements and supplies. We have to trust the kamikaze fighters to neutralise those warships before they come any closer. Without supplies we our efforts would be hampered greatly as the Allies try to surround and cut us off from the mainland to strangle us.

Tightening the Noose (October 1944)

Koizumi Nanasake

Captain, Japanese Freighter Kobayashi Maru

13^th October 1944

The Americans are like demons. How else could they be shrugging off the constant defeats dealt to them by our Navy? How else could they possibly sink so much of our shipping? I’ve been to America, I know that they are most certainly not demons. Therefore the fault, as it is becoming increasingly apparent to me, is with our own leadership.

We didn’t begin convoying till early this year, but by then we had already suffered catastrophic losses in terms of merchant shipping sunk. I suppose everyone was expecting the sinking rate to be something closer to that of 1942, but even then the Americans were sinking more ships than we were building. And our convoy escorts aren’t all that effective either. Just last month, despite heavy escort, the Azusa, one of our last few tankers, was sunk by an American submarine.

Japan needs more resources before it can build more merchants and escorts, but at the same time we don’t have enough merchant ships to bring those resources to Japan. Most of us had already been requisitioned by the Army and Navy anyway. And from what I heard from some of the other merchant captains, most of them dead now, there was nearly no organization at all in transporting those hard fought for materials back home. Two of them even mentioned passing by each other, heading to the port that the other left, while empty. Each was sent to pick up supplies from the other port, something that could have been done by a just one of them in half the time.

We certainly don’t have that sort of luxury anymore. We are currently on a resupply run to the Navy’s island bases, and we just departed Iwo Jima a few days ago. I can’t forget the Army doctor pleading with me for just a few more sacks of rice for his troops. While they weren’t dying of starvation just yet, many of them were suffering from diseases due to malnutrition. I sympathized, but my orders are very clear on how much to deliver. It’s bad everywhere anyway. In any case, our next stop is

[Record Ends]

Cutting the lifelines (May 1943)

Dick O’Kane, Executive officer, USS Wahoo.

23 May 1943

I have been with the men of the USS Wahoo for 5 patrols already and it now time for me to be moving on to command my own submarine, the new Balao-class submarine. But the time spent with the Wahoo is fruitful and I have learnt much from the skipper, Lt-Cmdr Morton.

In the first 2 patrol, we were made to patrol the shipping lanes just off Truk. The ships in that area were practical unescorted, not only for the merchant ships but also the Imperial Japanese naval ships. For instance, we came across an unescorted Japanese carrier but we were not able to attack it and the most defended convoy we saw was escorted only by one destroyer. I think that the Japanese were unaware of US presence in the area. However, even with the advantage that we have, we were not able to inflicted heavy damage on the Japanese. This is partly because of the lack of aggressive of Lt-Cmdr Kennedy, our first skipper, and bad positioning of the ship. The total number of ships we sank during that time was 2 freighters. We could have gotten more if we had been more aggressive in our tactic.

After the first 2 patrols, Lt-Cmdr Kennedy was transferred to the USS Guest and Lt-Comdr Morton took over as skipper of the ship. This change in command changed our fortunes. We departed for our 3^rd patrol on the 16 January and headed for a new patrolling area called Wewak near the north coast of New Guniea. We spotted and sunk a destroyer anchor off the Kairuru Island. On the same patrol, we caught up with an unescorted 4 ships convoy on the 26 January. The battle with that convoy lasted for 10 hours and we expended all of our torpedoes but it resulted in 2 sunken freighters, a badly damaged troop carrier and tanker.

The 4^th and 5^th patrol of the Wahoo produced the similar results. A total of 14 merchant ships were sunk, 11 on the 4^th patrol and 3 on the 5^th patrol. Up to now, the Japanese failed to put improve it protection on the merchant ships. The merchant ships were sailing without any escort nor travelling in huge convoys, this allowed us and the other US submarines to attack their vital supply routes without serious opposition for the Imperial navy. The Wahoo was so successful the Admiral Nimitz awarded Morton his second Navy Cross and other awards on the 22 May 1943. Now is time for the Wahoo to undergo an overhaul and it is time too for me to move on to another ship.

More damage could be done on them if we were equipped with better torpedoes. The Mark 14 torpedoes were unreliable; they would either detonate prematurely or would be a dud. This is very frustrating for us and many other submarines in the fleet. From what I heard from other submarine Cmdrs, they would be equipped with faulty torpedoes for an entire patrol. Rumour has it that a new type of torpedo is currently in developing and I hope that this new weapon would make the submarine force a more potent weapon in the war

The news is in! we got HIM! (April 1943)

18 April 1943

Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet

diary entry: 2210 hours

Yamamoto was escorted by a squadron of Zeros, but our Lightnings managed to break through their shield and shoot his plane down before it could take evasive action. Though we lost several pilots and planes in the attack, our pilots confirmed that Yamamoto's plane caught fire and crashed in the jungle..no way anyone could have survived that.

We’ve now gone part of the way in laying the ghosts of Pearl to rest, may his soul anoint for the men that have been lost, and may his loss to Japan now ensure our liberation of the rest of the Pacific and avenge fully Pearl Harbor!

Mission: Intercept and kill Yamamoto on his journey (April 1943)

10 April 1943

Admiral Nimitz, Commander in Chief, US Pacific Fleet

diary entry at 2330.

What an accomplishment our intel boys have pulled off, we’ve managed to decode a report transmitted on Japanese radio frequencies of that bastard’s Yamamoto decision to tour Japanese outposts in the Pacific. He will leave Rabaul on the 18th for the airfield in Kahili, Bougainville. What luck! His flight plan is just barely within range of our aircraft. Though it will require the maximum possible range of our Lightnings, with additional fuel tanks attached to their planes we can intercept and shoot the bastard down before reinforcements from Kahili can reach him. Though it will cost us more pilots and planes, the losses sustained to get him will suffice to avenge our brave air and ship crews lost in that “cheap shot” of an attack against Pearl. While we mourn, his plan has been herald as a master- class of deployment to take out your enemy unaware by surprise. Well, it time to pay him back with the same tactics, we CANNOT let him get away!

The Setting of the Sun (August 1942)

Captain Samuel Jenkins

USS Atlanta

26th August 1942

At Coral Sea and Midway, we the succeeded in halting the Japanese advance. In the Solomons, we not only stopped them, but pushed them back. The battle at Guadacanal just had to be the turning point for us. Almost everything in the fleet was committed to the battle.

The Battle of the Eastern Solomons, most of which took place on August 24, had been less a tremendous clash of arms than a series of skirmishes. Strategically for us it must be considered a partial failure since over these next few days Admiral Tanaka succeeded in landing large numbers of troops on Guadacanal.

What is distinctive about the Eastern Solomons is the inadequacy of our reconnaissance effort. Neither shore nor tender-based air came through when it was really needed. McCain's planes should have tracked the enemy first but they did not. When their patrols failed to come up with what was needed, carrier-borne planes should have but they did not either. Communications inadequacies only agravated the situation. Submarines contributed little if any and could have filled the reconnaissance gap.

Most pronounced in this battle was our ability to destroy enemy planes in both air combat and through anti-aircraft fire. Air losses decided the issue. Our navy lost a total of 17 carrier planes in the confused, hesitant and inconclusive clash, and Japan suffered several times that. In the end, the IJN broke off the fight after being stripped of their carrier aircraft although their powerful surface force was still largely intact. Their loss of Ryujo on the other hand, gave us a slight tactical victory especially since we managed to save the damaged Enterprise. Chitose also survived. We did not even attack Tanaka's Guadacanal reinforcement convoy until later.

Our fundamental problem was quite clear: we did not have sufficient sea control to be really secure on land. Neither does Japan however, even though some of their equipment and tactics were better suited to the kind of war being fought. This should be our next priority.

Aim for that Rising Sun (1942)

Battle of Midway

Ens. Ronald Weber, Dive Bomber Pilot, USS Enterprise

4th June, 1942

When we arrived over the Japanese fleet, it was still untouched. The previous attack from the planes based on Midway Island failed to do any damage on them, and it looks like our ancient torpedo bombers didn't score any hits either. Our planes were just not able to get close to the carrier fleet to attack them. Most of our losses was not because of the anti-aircraft guns from the carrier but instead, it was from the combat air patrol (CAP) and the dreadful Zero fighter. Our current front line fighter, the Wildcat, was not match to the Zero fighter, let alone the slower and less maneuver SBD and TBD bomber, hopefully the new fighter, the Hellcat will fare better against the Zero, but for now, we have to make do with this. Even though the Wildcat is more heavily armed and better protected, the Zero is more maneuverable thus making it a better dogfighter. Most of our current planes stand no chance against them. What is the point of having escort fighter planes when they can’t even protect themselves?

However, the wildcat pilots have employed a new tactic called the ‘Thach weave’ that would counter the superiority of the Zero fighter during dogfights. Due to the lack of agility of the wildcat fighters, the ‘Thach weave’ was invented whereby pairs of fighters would provide cover for the other by flying in a crisscross pattern. Because of ‘Thach weave’, the wildcats were able to give us better support from the Zeros and enabling us to focus our attacks on the carriers. But because this tactic was never used before, only one squadron was able to practise it. Hopefully the Navy will be able to follow up with this tactic as it has shown its effectiveness in just one engagement.

To make matter worse, the torpedoes that were equipped on our bombers were not helping our cause; they were not effective on the Japanese carriers. From where we were flying, we could see the torpedoes being fired against the carriers but the torpedoes were moving very slowly in the water and it seems like it travels way too near to the surface of the water. From what we heard from the other pilots, at least 10 being fired on the Hiryu but none manage to damage it. Furthermore, they said that naval personals on the carrier used the deck machine gun and manage to blow up one of the torpedo. The weapons that we had were just substandard. The Devastator torpedo bombers suffered heavy losses but no hits on the carriers.

However after the failed TBD attacks, luck was on the our side and we fared much better. Somehow, the attacks by the TBD were able to command most of the attention of the deadly Zero fighters and CAP, furthermore, the carriers were not able to launch more fighters into the air as the carriers had to take evasive actions due to the TBD attack. The attacks by both the TBD and SBD had thrown the CAP into disarray. Within a few hours of unrelentless attacks by our fighters, we had scored hits after hits on 3 of the Japanese carriers. From our view point flying overhead of the battlefield, we were able to the horizon blazing with burning oil, thick black smoke billowing out of the engulfed burning Japanese carriers. What joy for us to see such a sight.

No news about the other Japanese carriers. Though we have inflicted heavy loss on the Japanese carrier fleet, we too have suffered a lot, many of our pilots has yet to return.

On the other side of the Pond... (May 1942)

Admiral Chester Nimitz

CINCPAC, Pearl Harbor

27th May, 1942

Just saw Yorktown pull into the drydock. She's fought hard in the Coral Sea. Fletcher reports the sinking of the Ryukaku and the Shokaku.That leaves the IJN with around four to five carriers. We lost the Lexington, but one for two is a pretty good trade. More importantly, we've learned that our flyboys are just as capable as the Japs, though their equipment is certainly better.

Well, I'm going to need Yorktown to fight even harder soon, hence all the emergency yard work. Intelligence tells me that they've decoded the order of battle for the Japanese attack on Midway. They'll have four fleet carriers, and I'm not willing to send Enterprise and Hornet off on two to one odds, Midway air cover or no. But if we can fight them on an even footing, like we did down in the Solomons, we might be able to push our war plans ahead much sooner than anticipated. Saratoga will be here soon, Wasp by year's end along with Essex. BuShips tells me that I'll get five to six Essex class carriers per year starting next year. Even assuming a one to one exchange rate, we'll run them out of carriers very soon, and as soon as we destroy their main strike forces, we can move to the next stage of Plan Orange and secure operating bases in the Western Pacific from which to begin our air and surface blockade of Japanese merchant shipping.

Till then we'll have to rely on our submarines to interdict that shipping. But despite Stark's order for unrestricted submarine warfare, we aren't sinking all that many Japanese merchant ships. ComSubPac claims that it's the torpedoes, and I'm inclined to believe him and his submariners over some desk-jockey in BuOrd. But if that's the case, then we're going to have to pick up the slack by expediting the destruction of the Japanese carriers. I don't want them getting one more ounce of oil or gram of rubber if there's anything I can do about it!

A Fatalistic Outlook (May 1942)

Admiral Nagumo Chuichi

Commander, Carrier Striking Force

IJNS Yamato

3rd May, 1942

Once again, I decided to let Genda handle the wargames today. It's clear that Yamamoto doesn't value my input, and I can't oppose this operation any more without looking like a coward. The wargames are a clear indication of how the wind's blowing anyway. We've barely had month to plan this operation, one that will involve every single one of our capital ships, carriers and battleships alike, along with an Army contingent to handle ground invasions, and spread out across half of the Pacific! Yet Ugaki keeps glossing over the problems that arise during the games. Most of our staffs haven't worked together before, and we constantly run into delays or coordination failures. And that's just the staff side of the problem!

The tactical portion is clearly farcical as well. Earlier today, the staff officer playing the Red Force came up with an excellent plan. He concentrated the US carriers together and detached them from their battleships, allowing them to reach Midway far faster than we planned for. As such, they could engage my carriers in concert with land based air on Midway, hitting us in the flank while I was occupied with engaging Midway. We rolled the dice, and three carriers were sunk or heavily damaged. At this point, the invasion couldn't possibly continue without sufficient air cover. It was a sensible plan, just what I would have done if I was in the Americans' position.

But Ugaki thought otherwise. He said that those tactics were "impossible", and rewound the clock. Of course that staffer complained, but the poor young man had to shut up when Yamamoto chimed in about how the Americans were more likely to arrive in full force and attempt to relieve Midway instead.

So instead the operation goes as planned, and the land based bombers from Midway conduct an attack against my carriers. We roll the dice and Akagi and Kaga are sunk. Ugaki intervenes again, saying that that's impossible, and that only Kaga is hit, and is not even sunk for that matter, because we need it for later operations near Australia. It was at that point I gave up all hope that these wargames would have any value whatsoever. They are so obviously choreographed to fit what Yamamoto thinks should happen.

Still, he was right about Pearl Harbor. He might be right this time too. I certainly hope so, since we are in a rather precarious situation now. American resolve does not seem to be breaking, and we are in this for the long haul, we can't afford to lose any of our carriers. We have a solid advantage now, six fleet carriers to their five, and 5 light carriers to their one. Our pilots are better trained, and they have trained and fought together. But we need to gain a sufficiently large advantage as soon as possible. Other than Taiho, the other three of our fleet carriers under construction are all conversions. In the meantime, we know that the Americans are building no fewer than twelve dedicated fleet carriers. The only way to keep the odds even is to smash their entire carrier fleet now without taking any losses, and the haphazard way this operation is being executed is very worrying.

Now I am certainly not doubting the reason for this operation. Yamamoto is right, we must complete our destruction of the US Pacific Fleet while it is still weak. To do so, we must clearly draw them out of their safe haven in Pearl Harbor, and attacking Midway would certainly accomplish that task. But the Navy General Staff's incomprehensible focus on the Aleutians forces us to divide our already limited forces with our numerical advantage already being fairly slim. At the same time, due to weather conditions in the Aleutians, we must launch the attack in early June, hence the whole rush to prepare.

And planning and wargaming are just the start of our problems. Production in our naval aircraft plants have barely permitted to fully outfit the First Carrier Striking Force, but only after dangerously depleting the majority of our light carriers' airwings. As if that wasn't bad enough, Shokaku and Zuikaku are off attacking Port Moresby. They won't be able to train with the rest of the Striking Force after they get back, not to mention even though they aren't expected to encounter serious resistance, we'll probably need to deplete another light carrier for the aircraft and pilots to make up the losses.

Well, if something terrible happens, Akagi's sure to be a target, and I'll be able to go down with my ship.

The Lion's Claws, the Unicorn's Horn, Shattered (February 1942)

Lieutenant Tom Wade

15th February 1942

Singapore, the 'city of lions' had fallen. The greatest military name in all Asia and Australasia had been humbled after a 70-day campaign and with it had fallen the richest country of the world, taking into account its population - the rubber and tin-bearing Malay States. The defenders and the world were awestruck: a giant had proved to have feet of clay. Singapore had surrendered.

Contrary to popular belief, Singapore was not a fortress in any sense of the word. Millions of pounds had been spent with the idea of making it one, but millions more would still be needed. The money spent had bought it a well-equipped naval base, a giant floating dock, five 15-inch guns set in the hills facing the sea and a number of 9.2- and 6-inch batteries guarding the sea approaches. It had also bought many large barracks, three airfields and a well-defended small island, Blakang Mati, next to the harbour. But it provided zero defences of any kind on the northern, western and even portions of the southern shore of the island.

The Japanese had command of the air and command of the sea and proved themselves superior on land. Command of the air and sea could scarcely have been avoided in the Far East at that time, and around a peninsula like Malaya their superiority in those areas proved decisive. But superiority on land was due to more thorough training and greater experience. The Japanese made themselves masters of jungle warfare and fought with efficiency, determination and speed which only perfect training brings. They used their three main weapons - mortars, infantry guns and tanks - to the best possible effect, and to this they added unflagging determination and breathtaking speed.

Compare this to us, the British. Some of us had three years of war experience in China, whereas most of us had none. The generalship of General Yamashita was brilliant; our generalship was almost always bad and wrong. It was weak and uninspiring; its existence was rarely felt. And we had dreadfully underestimated the Japanese. A few of us tried to offer excuses for our defeat. They said we ran out of aircraft or ammunition or water. The answer to this was best given by a Lancashire private of the Loyal Regiment: 'The only thing we run out of was land!'.

Why I had not contemplated getting onto a ship out to sea bound for Java was beyond me. And now Changi awaits.

The Rising Sun over the Lion City (February 1942)

William Henry Giles,

February 14, 1942.

All is lost now. The Japanese troops have reached the center of the Singapore. In less than 100days, the British has been pushed back all the way from northern Malaya to Singapore. How is this even possible? The Japanese army just seems too powerful and invincible, no matter how strongly the British defended or counterattack, all their actions seem futile and were easily swept away by advancing Japanese. At the beginning of the war, we were told that the Japanese soldiers were incapable of jungle warfare, half blind and feeble, but the ‘feeble’ enemy was hammering the British blows after blows of defeat. Even with the British numerical advantage in both men and heavy artillery by 3 to 1, they were not able to stop the Japanese. The Japanese made up the disadvantage in heavy guns by capturing British guns and use it against them.

The swiftness of the Japanese attack down south was staggering. Bicycle infantry troops were able to out-maneuver the British defensive position. Furthermore, the Japanese infantry were being supported by tanks and aircrafts. By comparison, the British had no tanks at all and planes they had, the Brewster buffalos were outclassed by the Japanese Zero fighters. Naval support for the British vanished after the sinking of the only 2 warships in the region on the 10^th Dec, 1941.

The last ship departed Singapore on the 12^th of Feb; escaping the colony now is impossible. Surrender is most likely going to happen soon as all the reservoirs on island, the only water supply to Singapore has been severed. British rule on the island is over and now begins Japanese rule.

Corporal Parkinson Diary: Hong Kong (December 1941)

What kind of Boxing Day gift is this? Hong Kong gone. The whole Canadian force in the bag. All those Rifle guys from Quebec. And the Japs running wild all over the place! California being shelled. Hawaii expecting attack. Japs advancing in Malaya. And the Prince of Wales and Repulse sunk... Holy shit. As if we didn't have enough to do here already in Europe. Somebody screwed this up royally. All that bs about the Japs not having the nerve to attack the Americans and Brits. Just what the hell is going on? And I also have a hangover from that Christmas Party. Turkey was dry but the champagne was too good...

London, 26 December 1941

Japs in war (Corporal Parkinson diary) (December 1941)

The Japs attacked Hawaii!! Shit. Now it hits the fan. Well the Yanks are in now finally. Finally. But what do they do first day in? Take a kicking. They better be more than just big talk. Otherwise we are in it.

Rotting away here in 'merrie old England.' God this place is boring. How many hours have we done advance to contact drills the same damn way. When are we in? Year and a half here and the Quebec boys from the Royal Rifles get in first, in Hong Kong. Mind you, jungle telegraph says they are in it really deep. With the Yank fleet bashed, that seems credible. Is anyone ever going to extract digit and get our act together? Only ones seem to be doing any good fighting are Ivan. They must be tough mothers.

Salisbury Plain, 12 December 1941

Newsreel (December 1941)

7th December 1941 news

Prelude to Disaster (November 1941)

Commander Genda Minoru

Air Staff Officer, First Carrier Division

IJNS Akagi

November 30th, 1941

I'm certain that history will judge us favorably. After all, we have done everything in our power to avoid war with America, yet they refuse to acknowledge our legitimate position as the head of Asia. Their continued support to the Chinese government merely delays the inevitable victory of our Army and leads to more and more casualties. At the same time, their embargo has forced us to seek out those same strategic resources elsewhere, and the only place to get them is in the Dutch East Indies and in the British colonies.

To cover this strike to the south, Admiral Yamamoto is determined to destroy the US Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor. We have accurate intelligence from our consulate in Hawaii, our diplomats are keeping up the pretense of the possibility of a peaceful solution. We will sink the US Pacific Fleet, get our Army the six months they need to complete their conquest of the Southern Resource Area while we establish our defensive line, then we will present the Americans with a fait accompli and negotiate a settlement. At least that's what the government thinks will happen. If not, then the situation gets a lot more complicated.

I still think that we're going about this the wrong way. Just sinking the Pacific Fleet is not enough. We need to take Pearl Harbor out of the picture completely. I know a few other staffers agree with me, including fellow planner Commander Watanabe. If we follow up our attack with a ground invasion, we will not only deny the United States their main naval base in the Pacific, but also capture a large portion of their Pacific Fleet personnel, something that will greatly affect their ability to recover from the attack.

Unfortunately, the Army lacks the forces necessary for such an invasion while simultaneously launching one in the South. At the same time, we likely lack the transports to support all the operations at once, and the difficulties we are encountering with regards to refueling operations of our fleet so far beyond its standard operations area will no doubt be exacerbated.

Still, even with such limited aims, we are still risking a lot. All six of our active fleet carriers will be involved in the attack and to achieve the strike concentration required, all six must sail close together, providing an excellent target if we are discovered and the Americans are able to offer battle. While we will most likely prevail in this scenario, war is a fickle beast. Furthermore, we need every single one of those carriers to support the Army's operations in the South, to engage British naval forces in the region, and eventually to handle an American counterattack. And unlike the Americans, we cannot easily replace our ships. At least not until we get the Southern Resource Area up and running.

In any case, grand strategy is out of my hands. I should keep my mind in the present. I have confidence in my plan, in Fuchida and his flyboys, and of course the Admiral. If nothing else, our attack will be remembered as one of the most audacious in history!